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Castro, Fidel. “Mobilising the Masses for the Invasion.” Speech, Santa Clara, Cuba, March 28, 1961.

Kennedy, John F. “Address After Bay of Pigs.” Speech, Washington D.C., April 20, 1961.

White House, Memorandum. “Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba”, August 22, 1961.

White House, Memorandum. “Proposal for "Command Operation" in Cuba”, November 1, 1961.

White House, Memoradum. "Verbal Message to President Johnson from Fidel Castro" February 12, 1964.

Universal International News, “Bay of Pigs News Reel”. Accessed December 16, 2014, 


Brenner, Philip. “Cuba and the Missile Crisis”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (February 1990), 115-142.

This article, which was focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis, also had valuable information on the steps leading up to the event, chief among them was the Bay of Pigs invasion.  It noted why and how Cuba had good reason to fear the U.S. both before and after the Invasion of the Bay of Pigs.  The article painted the picture of suspicion and deceit on both sides.

Hansen, Morten T. “How John F. Kennedy Changed Decision Making for Us All”, Harvard Business Review, November 22, 2013.

Hansen argues that the Bay of Pigs was pivotal not just for Kennedy and the course of US-Cuban relationships, but that it resonates even today.  The reason being is that Kennedy redesigns the decision making process and has instilled candid debate, rather than let the idea of “groupthink” be perpetuated.  It is a case where a leader has learned so profoundly upon his previous mistakes.

Louis Taylor, Henry Jr. and McGlynn, Linda. “International tourism in Cuba: Can capitalism be used to save socialism?” Futures, vol. 41, no. 6, August 2009.

I drew on this article mostly for statistics about tourism to Cuba prior to the Revolution of 1959.  It painted the lofty picture of a haven for American business to escape to and fulfill their vices before catching a plane back to the states to return to normalcy.  Also from this article was the quote from Arthur Shlesigner recalling his trip to Cuba and how it set the stage for Cuban resentment towards Americans based on how they treated the locals.

Mayer, William G. “Trends: American Attitudes towards Cuba.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Winter 2001): 585-606.

Using a combination of Gallup and other independently arranged polls, Mayer tracks the trends in attitude towards Cuba, with the first question being asked in 1959 after the revolution.  Trends reveal that most Americans have not regarded Cuba as a constant and serious threat, even though the country was the center of heavily-covered incidents throughout the Cold War.  American attitudes for Castro have varied significantly since the Revolution and reached a low-point before the Bay of Pigs fiasco.  His perception in the US only improves when Cold War tensions ease up as well.

Perez, Louis A. “Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy toward Cuba.” The Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2002): 227-254.

Perez’s article traces U.S. policy towards Cuba and how it was nearly hell-bent on punishing Cuba for the wrongs of Fidel Castro.  The U.S. deeply resisted his advances for a modus vivendi.  This fixation was only increased and Kennedy’s resolved more determined after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.  It seemed that in several months of 1962, all U.S. foreign policy focused on was a solution to the “Cuban problem”.  The article quotes many of Kennedy’s advisors recalling that he had become obsessed at returning the humiliation that Castro had delivered to him.

Rasenberger, Jim. The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs. New York: Scribner, 2011.Rasenberger book on the Bay of Pigs carefully traces the missteps made and warnings ignored in all the intricacies leading up to the Bay of Pigs invasion.  The story also focuses on a young Fidel Castro who is plotted in stark contrast to Kennedy throughout the course of the book.  For the intents of my research, I looked at Rasenberger’s opinions on the implications and aftermath that the Bay of Pigs invasion left for Kennedy’s administration.  Rasenberger argues that it worked in Kennedy’s favor ultimately.

Rosenberg, Carol. “CIA’s Bay of Pigs foreign policy laid bare”, Miami Herald, August 27, 2011.

Following the release of some previously classified material in 2011, the White House revealed the CIA’s role in how American dealth with the governments of Guatamala and Nicaragua in order to cover up the U.S.’s involvement in the Bay of Pigs. This offers further proof that the U.S. was willing to prop up brutal dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere, so long as they were not susceptible to the reach of the USSR and communism.  Reports show, in detail, how everything was provided by the CIA and other American agencies, Cuban exiles provided only the “blood, sweat, and tears.”

Sandman, Joshua H. “Analyzing Foreign Policy Crisis Situations: The Bay of Pigs”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2. (1986): 310-316.

The article examined how the Bay of Pigs was such a fiasco because of the poor planning going into it, along with the pitfalls of Kennedy in the planning of the invasion.  While not calling it “groupthink” as many other analysts do, Sandman points out ther was a strong push for within group cohesiveness in the Kennedy administration.

Trumbell, Charles. “Prostitution and Sex Tourism in Cuba”, Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE), 2001.

Similar to the “International tourism in Cuba” article, this was used primary to write the Tourism in Cuba section of the exhibit.  It described in some detail the outlay of Cuban society that lead to sex tourism, or the pervasiveness of prostitution in Cuban society pre-revolution.  It also explained how Castro brought the sex business to a halt, as he was bent on ending prostitution and incorporating Cuban women into the working force.

Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. “Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Autumn 1984): 471-491.

Vandenbroucke applies the “Cognitive Theory”, which holds that the human mind strikes for congruence of beliefs and perceptions, to the Kennedy administration.  This seems to be another phrasing for “Groupthink” syndrome.  Vandenbroucke points out the CIA’s dismissal of off-setting reports that stressed Castro’s forces were stronger than the U.S. wanted to believe.  The lessons learned from the invasion were to not trust the experts, in this case, the Kennedy team planning the invasion.  Secondly, it is necessary to be skeptical of the consensus.